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Abstract
This paper studies the inﬂuence of persuasive advertising in a neoclassical growth model
with monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings show that advertising can signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the stationary equilibrium of a model economy in which the labor supply is endogenous.
In this case, for empirically plausible calibrations, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium level of hours
worked, GDP, and consumption increase with the amount of resources invested in advertising.
These ﬁndings are consistent with a new stylized fact provided in this paper: over the past
decade, per-capita advertising expenditures have been positively correlated with per-capita
output, consumption and hours worked across OECD countries. Because of the connection
between advertising and labor supply, we show that our model improves on its neoclassical
counterpart in explaining both within-country and cross-country variability of hours worked
per capita.
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The goal of this paper is to study the inﬂuence of persuasive advertising in a neoclassical
growth model with an endogenous labor supply and monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. Building
on the work of Dixit and Norman (1978), we introduce advertising into the dynamic representative
agent’s framework by assuming that consumers’ tastes are endogenously determined, in that they
depend on ﬁrms’ spending on advertising. This assumption generates a positive linkage between the
demand of consumption goods and producers’ advertising as the result of consumers’ optimization
behavior. Such a linkage, in turn, provides a rationale for ﬁrms’ advertising spending, thereby
introducing advertising into a dynamic general equilibrium set up as an endogenous ﬁrm’s decision
policy.
The main reason to study the inﬂuence of advertising in a general equilibrium framework is
to investigate its potential eﬀects on the aggregate economy. The literature on advertising has
often speculated about the way advertising would aﬀect macro variables.1 The basic argument
supporting this idea relies on the indirect eﬀect that advertising may have on aggregate demand.
Although advertising itself is a relatively small sector of aggregate production, by its own nature
it may have a relevant eﬀect on aggregate consumption.2 Since consumption is a major com-
ponent of aggregate demand, through this channel advertising may create important distortions
in the economy. In this paper, we push this argument further by claiming that such distortions
can be properly assessed only in a dynamic general equilibrium context. Suppose, for instance,
that advertising stimulates aggregate consumption at the expense of saving. Then, it would con-
temporaneously increase consumption and crowd out investment, therefore having an unclear net
eﬀect on the aggregate demand. A partial equilibrium analysis would clearly fail to account for
this trade-oﬀ eﬀect. Moreover, by reducing investment, advertising may restrict future production
capacity, thus creating a distortion between future demand and supply of goods. A static model
would miss this connection. Additionally, advertising may imply a reallocation of resources across
sectors, thereby indirectly creating pressures on prices in the productive factors markets and thus
distorting the aggregate supply.
The model provided in this paper allows us to identify the conditions under which the presence
of advertising signiﬁcantly aﬀects the aggregate economy in the long run. We show that the eﬀect
of advertising on the main economic aggregates depends crucially on the endogenous response of
labor. From the standpoint of households, advertising operates in our framework as an endogenous
taste shock that makes households more inclined to substitute consumption for leisure. All else
being equal, this implies that an increase in aggregate advertising shifts the labor supply schedule
to the right, thereby making consumers willing to work more in order to consume more. In
the general equilibrium, the larger supply of labor also increases the equilibrium levels of GDP,
consumption and investment. If instead we assume an exogenous labor supply, the results are the
opposite: by reducing the equilibrium level of GDP and increasing the average markup, advertising
essentially exacerbates the distortions caused by the monopolistically competitive structure of the
goods market.
The eﬀect of advertising on labor supply operates as a powerful mechanism that magniﬁes the
long-run impact of advertising on the main economic aggregates. By calibrating the model to
the U.S. economy, our framework predicts that the equilibrium levels of worked hours, GDP, and
consumption in the U.S. are, respectively, about 9%, 8%, and 8.2% higher than in a counterfactual
economy in which U.S. ﬁrms could not advertise their products.
1See Bagwell (2007) for an exhaustive survey on the related literature.









The relationship established in this paper between aggregate advertising and labor supply is of
particular interest in light of the literature on diﬀerentials in hours worked across countries, e.g.,
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) and Prescott (2004). Our paper contributes to this literature
by showing that advertising could be one determinant of such diﬀerentials. In this perspective,
we document a novel stylized fact: over the past decade, per-capita advertising expenditures have
been positively correlated with per-capita output, consumption and hours worked across the OECD
countries. This is another important contribution of our paper. Also, we provide two numerical
exercises that contrast the models’ predictions with actual data. Our results show that the model
with advertising better explains both within-country and cross-country variability of labor supply
than the neoclassical model. On one hand, by allowing for only cross-country heterogeneity in
the size of the advertising sector, our model is able to explain between 25% and 33% of the
observed diﬀerences in hours worked between some selected European countries and the US. On
the other hand, by performing a business cycle accounting exercise in the spirit of Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2007), we show that our model predicts an increasing pattern for the US labor
supply during the boom in the 1990s that resembles the observed increase. We also show that this
prediction sensibly improves on the one made by the canonical RBC model, which fails to predict
any upward trend in hours worked.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to advocate a potential relationship between advertising and labor
supply. Among the others, Brack and Cowling (1983) provided empirical evidence in favor of
such a linkage for the US economy; more recently, Fraser and Paton (2003) empirically supported
the same relationship for the UK economy. Our paper improves on this literature by providing
a theoretical framework to rationalize such a relationship and, using this framework, showing
that advertising can have an important eﬀect not only on labor supply but also on several macro
aggregates.
Another implication of our model is that, for empirically plausible calibration, the presence
of advertising results in a higher equilibrium level of hours worked, output and, simultaneously,
ﬁrms’ markup. This feature is particularly interesting for at least two reasons. First, it provides
a theoretical counterexample to standard results, showing that an increase in market power is not
necessarily associated with a lower level of both hours worked and output. Second, it suggests that
utility-diminishing advertising can still be welfare enhancing. By reducing the aggregate leisure
in the economy, advertising mitigates the distortion associated with the monopolistically compet-
itive structure of the goods market, thus possibly bringing the economy closer to the competitive
equilibrium. In the model economy, however, this positive eﬀect on welfare is oﬀset by the in-
crease in ﬁrms’ markup due to advertising. To understand which eﬀect prevails, we performed a
welfare analysis that takes into account the endogenous nature of consumers’ taste, as shown by
Benhanib and Bisin (2002). For empirically plausible values of model parameters, we found that
the consumer is worse oﬀ with advertising. Interestingly, unlike canonical results, welfare losses
in our framework are driven by the ”overworking” eﬀect induced by advertising and not by the
reduction in consumption due to higher prices (higher markup). Consumption, in fact, generally
increases with advertising, as we will show in Section 4.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents some empirical evidence.
Section 3 describes the model economy. Section 4 quantiﬁes the long-run eﬀects resulting from the
presence in the economy of advertising activities by ﬁrms. Section 5 contrasts model predictions
with actual data on worked hours from both within-country and cross-country perspectives. Sec-





























































































Figure 1: Advertising share in the US, Japan, the UK and Germany. Advertising share
is calculated as the ratio of total advertising expenditures (all the media) to GDP. The horizontal
line indicates the sample average mean.
2 Stylized Facts
This section provides empirical stylized facts for the advertising industry in several OECD
countries. In what follows, we deﬁne aggregate advertising in a speciﬁc country as the total
spending of domestic and foreign ﬁrms that advertise their products in that country’s media. Our
dataset contains annual ﬁgures of GDP, aggregate consumption, hours worked, population and
advertising expenditures. Data were collected from several diﬀerent sources. Details are provided
in the Appendix.
We began our analysis by documenting the relative importance of the advertising sector across
countries. To this end, ﬁgure 1 provides graphs of aggregate advertising expenditures as a per-
centage of GDP (henceforth, advertising share) in the US, Japan, Germany, and the UK. In terms
of resources invested in this sector, one observes that advertising is a sizeable industry in all the
countries considered, being equivalent to more than 1% of GDP. There are, however, remarkable
cross-countries diﬀerences. Germany and the UK are similar, with an advertising share that on
average accounts for slightly less than 1.4% of the GDP. The US has the highest value for the
advertising share, more than 2%. The lowest value is in Japan, with almost 1.15%. There is not
a clear trend in any of the ﬁgures we considered; rather, it seems that the advertising share has
ﬂuctuated around a constant mean, thereby indicating that, in each country, the average growth
rate of advertising and GDP are approximately the same. The observed ﬂuctuations are probably
due to cyclical episodes. In fact, as shown by Molinari and Turino (2009), advertising has a well
deﬁned pattern over the course of the business cycle, being pro-cyclical and highly volatile.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for advertising expenditures, GDP, and consumption in
the G7 countries. To render the ﬁgures comparable, all data are in dollars with constant PPP


















USA 1984-2005 2.27 1.09 16.4 48.1 67.7 33.0
GBR 1.54 0.56 10.7 36.1 61.0 22.3
DEU 1.49 0.53 9.82 35.6 57.0 20.5
JPN 1.16 0.40 5.20 34.9 54.1 19.2
CAN 1996-2005 0.90 0.38 6.27 42.1 55.3 23.3
FRA 0.69 0.28 4.74 39.9 54.9 22.6
ITA 0.67 0.25 4.17 37.5 58.6 22.2
Note: Inv refers to total private ﬁxed investment net of housing while Pop is the total person aged 15-64. All the
variables are expressed in dollars with constant PPP and constant prices. Average means over the selected period
of time.
the average mean of both per-capita advertising and advertising expenditures as a percentage
of non-residential ﬁxed investment. Per-capita advertising proxies the intensity of advertising in
the economy−the number of messages for individual−while the ratio of advertising expenditures
to non-residential ﬁxed investment measures the relative importance of advertising as a ﬁrm’s
investment policy.3
Three main features of the data are worth emphasizing. First, the table shows that advertising
expenditures, ranging from a minimum of 4.17% to a maximum of 16.4%, account for a relevant
part of the aggregate productive investment in the G7 countries, displaying once again a remarkable
degree of cross-country variability. The data for the US economy are particularly striking: in this
country, the amount of resources invested in the advertising sector are equivalent to 16.4% of all
productive investment, thereby suggesting that advertising is a particularly important component
of the US ﬁrms’ investment budget.
Second, independent of whether we use the share of GDP or per-capita expenditures as an
indicator, our data show a clear positive cross-country correlation between per-capita real GDP
and advertising. In each block of the table, the countries with the highest level of advertising are
also characterized by the highest level of per-capita GDP. Moreover, this interesting feature holds
true when we extend our sample to 18 OECD countries. As shown in ﬁgure 2 (panel A), there
in fact exists a strong positive cross-country correlation between per-capita GDP and per-capita
advertising. The estimated elasticity is positive (0.45) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
with an R2 coeﬃcient of 0.42 (see table 2, column A).
Third, our data also show that consumption4 and advertising are positively correlated across
the G7 countries. This feature of the data is particularly important for the purposes of this paper,
as the literature on the macroeconomic eﬀect of advertising has often emphasized that the link be-
tween advertising and the economy, if it exists, must be established with consumption rather than
with GDP.5 As originally proposed by Galbraith (1967), the idea is that marketing activities in
general, and advertising in particular, by promoting new and larger desires for material consump-
3In the literature, advertising is typically intended as a type of investment for ﬁrms−an intangible asset that, by
aﬀecting demand for more than one period, provides revenues that extend into the future. See Arrow and Nerlove
(1962).
4Either as a percentage of GDP or in per-capita terms.








































































































































































































Figure 2: Scatter plots. Panels A, B, and C graph respectively the logs of per capita GDP,
Consumption, and Hours against per capita advertising. Panel D graphs the logs of per capita
hours versus advertising share (in percentage). Average means over the period of time 1996-2005.
Source for aggregate advertising expenditures: WARC. See the data appendix for details.
tion may have important market-enhancing eﬀects, thereby aﬀecting not only the distribution of
market shares across ﬁrms, as suggested by the conventional wisdom,6, but also the market size
of consumption goods and eventually aggregate consumption.7 Since consumption is the major
component of aggregate demand, advertising may possibly aﬀect GDP and, therefore, the aggre-
gate economy. This characteristic of advertising has been recognized by the specialized literature,
and most empirical studies on the macroeconomic eﬀects of advertising focus on its potential link
with aggregate consumption. In general, there exists evidence of bi-directional causation (in the
Granger sense) between advertising and consumption.8 However, those studies focus on individual
countries, while our data allow for a cross-countries analysis.
In order to explore this issue, panel B of ﬁgure 2 plots per-capita consumption expenditures
versus per-capita advertising for 18 OECD countries. As we can see, there exists a positive and
signiﬁcant relationship between these two variables, thereby providing cross-country evidence of the
connection between advertising and aggregate consumption. The estimated elasticity is positive
(0.55) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, with an R2 of 0.61.
When comparing the United States with European countries, it has been often noted that
Americans work more than Europeans. The literature has provided several diﬀerent explanations
for this fact. Prescott (2004) suggested that the observed diﬀerences in hours worked between
Europe and the US can be explained by diﬀerences in marginal tax rates on labor income. Alesina
6See Simon (1970).
7Galbraith (1967) was among the ﬁrst to suggest that advertising may have important market-enhancing eﬀects.
In his vision, because of advertising, the economy becomes more consumption based.
8See, for instance, Ashley et al. (1980) or, more recently, Jung and Seldom (1994). For a structural approach








Table 2: Simple Regressions











Per-Capita Adv 0.452 0.553 0.269 - -
(0.004) (0.000) (0.011) - -
Advertising Share - - - 0.338 0.717
- - - (0.015) (0.058)
Constant 4.166 3.659 7.282 6.704 6.392
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.420 0.612 0.343 0.318 0.250
Columns A-D report the estimated relationship graphed in ﬁgure 2. Column E report estimates for the relation-
ship by hours worked and advertising share by excluding the US, the UK, and Portugal (PRT) from the sample. All
the variables, with the exception of advertising share, are in logs. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 18 OECD
countries. Average mean over 1996-2006. Source of advertising expenditures data: WARC.
et al. (2005) indicated that the major diﬀerences between Europe and the US are largely due
to the European labor market regulations advocated by politically powerful unions. Blanchard
(2004) argues that Europeans enjoy leisure more than Americans do. Cowling and Poolsomnute
(2007) take a diﬀerent stand on the issue, arguing that ”the intensity of creation of wants through
advertising and marketing might be an inﬂuence on decisions made by Americans about how much
time they should devote to paid work, and how much time to leisure”. The argument of the authors
is based on the vision that advertising ”creates a continuing dissatisfaction with current levels of
consumption, that may encourage people to oﬀer a larger fraction of their time for the generation of
income in order to satisfy their increased demands for material consumption”. As a consequence,
the pressure to consume provided by advertising will also aﬀect the labor supply. Evidence for
such a phenomenon is documented by Brack and Cowling (1983) for the US labor supply and,
more recently, by Fraser and Paton (2003) for the UK economy.
In order to explore this issue in a cross-country dimension, in panels B and C of ﬁgure 2 we
report per-capita hours worked (in logs) versus per-capita advertising and advertising share. In
both cases, we ﬁnd a positive cross-country correlation, with an estimated elasticity that is always
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (see table 2). However, the correlation between
advertising share and hours worked (see panel D) appears to be less clear than in the other cases:
the R2 coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly lower than for all the other estimates, and, in particular, the
relationship appears to be driven by the observations for the US, the UK, and Portugal. For this
reason, we repeated the regression by excluding those countries from the sample. As shown in
column E of table 2, results did not change dramatically: although the estimates in this case are
less precise than before, the estimated elasticity is still positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
To summarize, our empirical analysis showed that advertising is a sizeable sector in the most
industrialized countries, displaying a substantial degree of cross-country variability. In the US,








provide evidence in favor of a positive cross-country correlation between advertising and the main
macro aggregates, such as GDP, consumption and hours worked.
3 The Model
In this section, we lay out a baseline model that captures the main features of advertising
in a general equilibrium setup. The basic structure of the model is the standard neoclassical
growth model augmented with a monopolistically competitive structure of product markets a la
Dixit-Stiglitz. The main diﬀerence with the canonical framework is that, in our model, ﬁrms may
promote their products by incurring advertising expenditures. Following Dixit and Norman (1978),
we introduced this feature into the representative agent’s framework by assuming that consumers’
tastes are endogenously determined, depending on the aggregate expenditures in advertising activ-
ities by ﬁrms. This assumption implies a positive linkage between demand for consumption goods
and producers’ advertisements as a result of individual optimization behavior, thereby providing
a rationale for ﬁrms’ spending on advertising activities.
3.1 Households
The economy consists in a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1], each pro-
duced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. We assume that the representative consumer has
preferences for consumption and hours worked described by the following utility function:




















where   Ct is the consumption aggregate, Ht is the time devoted to work, and ξ is a parameter
aﬀecting the disutility of labor. To ensure that the economy evolves along a balanced growth path,
we assume that representative household derives utility from   Ct relative to the level of technology,
At that evolves at the constant rate γa > 1. As in An and Schorfheide (2007), we interpret this
term as an exogenous habit stock component. The composite consumption aggregate   Ct is deﬁned
as follows:













where ε>1 is the pseudo-elasticity of substitution across varieties; gi,t is the goodwill stock asso-
ciated with good i, which will be deﬁned shortly; and B(·) is a decreasing and convex function of
the goodwill stock controlling for the eﬀect of advertising on consumer’s preferences and satisfying
B(0,A t) ≥ 0 ∀ At ∈ R+.9 As we will see in the next section, the dependence of B(·)o nt h er a t e
of technology At is a necessary condition to guarantee the existence of a balanced growth path
equilibrium.
Building on the work of Arrow and Nerlove (1962), we modeled the dynamic eﬀect of advertising
by assuming that current and past advertising for a good combine to create the producer’s goodwill,
9The consumption aggregate (3.2) is a Stone-Geary-type non-homothetic utility function. Depending on whether
the term B(gi,t) is assumed to be positive or negative, the utility displays a saturation point or a subsistence level








which, in turn, is deﬁned as the intangible stock of advertising that aﬀects the consumer’s utility
at time t, as shown in (3.2). The stock of goodwill evolves according to the law of motion:
gi,t = ωzi,t +( 1− δg)gi,t−1 (3.3)
where zi,t is a ﬁrm’s investment in new advertising at time t, δg ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate
of the goodwill and ω>0 is a parameter determining the advertising eﬃciency that might reﬂect
institutional aspects, such as speciﬁc regulations, e.g. advertising bans or taxation.
Equation (3.1) is the key to making room for advertising in this model. It represents a
non-homothetic version of the consumption aggregate originally proposed by Dixit and Norman
(1978).10 In this formulation, advertising is intended to be purely persuasive in the sense that it
aﬀects consumer choice by modifying his/her tastes without conveying any information about the
characteristics of the good.11 For each variety i, this eﬀect is controlled by function B(·), whose
properties are restricted in order to guarantee a positive linkage between a ﬁrm’s advertisements
and sales. This feature is made apparent by explicitly deriving the demand curve for each individ-
ual variety. The latter is the solution to the dual problem of minimizing consumption expenditures





















is the nominal price index. Given (3.4), it is easy to verify that the monotonically decreasing
behavior of the function B(·) implies that the demand of each variety is increasing with the
ﬁrm’s advertising eﬀort. This feature hinges on the property that consumers’ preferences are
endogenously determined in our model. In fact, an increase in the advertising spending by a ﬁrm
raises the goodwill stock of its own product and, at the same time, aﬀects the consumers’ taste by
increasing the marginal utility of that particular variety. As a result, the consumer’s willingness
to pay for that good rises, thereby causing an upward shift in the demand schedule. Furthermore,
the convexity of function B(·) guarantees a sort of saturation eﬀect by inducing decreasing returns
from advertising.
It is interesting to note that our framework implicitly embeds the combative nature of adver-
tising. By diﬀerentiating equation (3.4) with respect to the goodwill stock, and assuming that a
10Non-homothetic preferences have recently received growing attention in macroeconomics. Ravn et al. (2006)
modeled habit formation at the level of individual varieties using a non-homothetic consumption aggregator, which
is essentially the same as the one we assumed here. There are indeed several similarities between our framework and
the recent ”deep habits” literature. See Molinari and Turino (2009) for further discussion on this point.
11Although the way advertising aﬀects consumers’ decisions is a rather controversial issue, we choose to focus on
persuasive advertising for several reasons. First, as emphasized in Kaldor (1950), advertising, since it is pursued
by an interested party, largely tries to persuade rather than to inform consumers and therefore is persuasive in
nature. Second, recent studies of behavioral economists provided evidence on how consumers’ tastes are distorted
by advertising. Among others, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) showed that, in context of informative advertising,
information revelation may break down in the presence of consumers that fail to foresee ”shrouded attributes,”
such as hidden fees or maintenance costs. Finally, focusing on non-informative advertising allows us to get rid of


















 −ε ∂B(gi,t,A t)
∂g
di < 0 ∀ i ∈ [λ,1]
In other words, when (enough of) the other ﬁrms increase their spending in advertising, the
eﬀect on ﬁrm i’s demand is negative. Consequently, for a given level of consumption expenditures,
any asymmetrical distribution in the goodwill stocks merely redistributes demand among ﬁrms,
thereby causing an asymmetrical distribution in market shares.
The rest of the model is standard. We assume that the capital stock, Kt, held by the repre-
sentative consumer evolves over time according to the law of motion:
Kt+1 = It +( 1− δk)Kt (3.5)
where the investment in period t, It is assumed to be a composite good produced by aggregating














As before, for any level of It, purchases of each variety i ∈ [0,1] in period t must solve the dual








Notice that advertising does not directly aﬀect the investment expenditures decision. This
assumption implies that any link between advertising and investment is driven by general equilib-
rium eﬀects. This allows us to embed in the model a possible crowd-out eﬀect of advertising on
investment, as we will see in the next section.
The consumer supplies labor services per unit of time and rents whatever capital he owns to
ﬁrms. The labor and capital markets are perfectly competitive, so that each consumer takes as
given the wage rate Wt paid per unit of labor services and the rental rate Rt paid per unit of
capital. In addition, the consumer receives pure proﬁt from the ownership of ﬁrms, Πt. The ﬂow
budget constraint faced by the representative consumer is then given by the following equation:
1  
0
pi,t (ci,t + ii,t)di ≤ WtHt + RtKt +Π t (3.8)
The intertemporal maximization problem for the representative consumer can be stated as
consisting of choosing processes   Ct, Ht so as to maximize the utility function (3.1) subject to (3.5)
and (3.8).12 The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for an interior maximum of U are
A
(σ−1)
t   C−σ
t = λt (3.9)
12Notice that in the derivation of the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for this maximization problem, we rewrite
the budget constraint (3.8) by using the following property:
1  
0











λt = β {λt+1 [Rt +( 1− δk)]} (3.10)
ξH
φ
t = Wtλt (3.11)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint (3.8). Equation (3.10) is the familiar
Euler equation that gives the intertemporal optimality condition. Equation (3.11), under the
assumption of a perfect competitive labor market, instead describes the supply of hours.
The optimality conditions (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11) mimic those of the standard neoclassical
growth model, but with the remarkable diﬀerence that the deﬁnition of the shadow price λt depends
not only on aggregate consumption but also on aggregate goodwill. Consequently, consumers’
decisions about labor and investment are aﬀected by the level of aggregate advertising.13
This mechanism plays a pivotal role in determining the general equilibrium results that we will
explore in the next section. A partial equilibrium analysis is useful for understanding how advertis-
ing aﬀects the consumers’ behavior. Suppose, for instance, that advertising expenditures increase
exogenously for a suﬃciently large fraction of ﬁrms. Given our assumptions,
 
B (gi,t,A t)di de-
creases, and, as a consequence, the consumer’s shadow price λt increases. Consider now the labor
supply schedule (3.11). An increase in λt implies that the agent values consumption more than
leisure, since the marginal rate of substitution increases for any given wage. Hence, the labor
supply schedule shifts to the right; i.e., the agent is willing to work more in order to consume
more.
An increase in λt also aﬀects the consumer’s saving decisions by changing the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in the Euler equation (3.10). However, since (3.10) is a function of the ratio
of current λt over future λt+1 marginal utility, the sign of the eﬀect of higher advertising depends
on the relative response of current over future goodwill. In this simple example, the eventual
eﬀect is easily predictable. Goodwill is an AR(1) process, and we assume a one-time increase
in advertising; thus, current consumption will increase. In general, an increase in advertising
due to an exogenous shock, while unambiguously shifting the labor supply schedule to the right,
has an eﬀect on the saving function that is determined by the dynamic response of expected
future goodwill to a shock, which itself depends on several diﬀerent general equilibrium eﬀects
that combine together. In particular, however, whenever the expected growth rate of goodwill is
positive, the consumer ﬁnds it more convenient to postpone his consumption, since he foresees
that his marginal utility will be higher in the future. Conversely, when the growth rate of goodwill
is negative, the consumer experiences an urge to consume and increases his demand for current
consumption.
3.2 Firms
In this model, ﬁrms make decisions on pricing policy, production plans, and budgets for adver-
tising activities. We assume that each ﬁrm uses two types of input: labor and capital. To produce
goods, ﬁrms have access to a common technology of the following form:
yi,t = k1−α
i,t (hp,t(i)At)
α − AtF (3.12)
13In particular, insofar as   Ct has a negative ﬁrst derivative with respect to the aggregate goodwill, then advertising








where yi,t, ki,t,a n dhp,t(i) respectively denote ﬁrm i’s output, capital stock, and the amount of
production-related labor. At measures the (labor augmented) technological progress evolving at a
positive constant rate γa; α ∈ (0,1) and F is a ﬁxed cost.
Each ﬁrm may promote its products by incurring advertising expenditures. As in Grossmann
(2008), we assume that ﬁrms produce advertising in house by using a common technology that
requires only labor, that is:
zi,t = At (ha,t(i))
α (3.13)
where zi,t and ha,t(i)d e n o t eﬁ r mi’s advertising eﬀort and the amount of marketing-related labor,
respectively. By getting rid of complications related to the speciﬁcation of an advertising sector,
this assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis without aﬀecting our main conclusions.





 −ε  
  Ct + It
 
− B(gi,t,A t) (3.14)
The non-homotheticity of the consumption aggregate (3.2) implies that the demand schedule
features a non-constant elasticity of demand. Using (3.14), it is in fact easy to verify the following:
ξ (yi,t,g i,t)=
   





   







which shows that the price elasticity of demand depends, over time, on the ratio B(gi,t,A t)/yi,t.
This feature hinges on the property that total demand (3.14) is composed of two terms: one is
perfectly inelastic with respect to the price, while the other has a constant elasticity. As a conse-
quence, the resulting price elasticity is a combination of the elasticities of these two components,
and the value of price elasticity depends, over time, on the relative importance of the inelastic
term over total demand.
Most importantly, the elasticity of demand of each variety decreases with the producer’s in-
vestment in advertising. This feature has a natural interpretation in terms of the degree of sub-
stitutability among goods. Intuitively, we can think that advertising activities by a ﬁrm, which
attach peculiar attributes to the product, increase the consumers’ perceived diﬀerentiation with
respect to rival products. In our framework, when a ﬁrm increases its spending in advertising,
it directly aﬀects consumers’ tastes, thus making that ﬁrm’s product more valuable in terms of
utility. Thus, the cost for the consumer of switching from that good to another increases. Or,
equivalently, the degree of substitutability between goods decreases. Because of this perception of
product diﬀerentiation, the consumer is now willing to pay a higher price for the advertised good,
and the producer’s market power increases.
We next incorporate the demand (3.14) into the proﬁt-maximizing problem of ﬁrms. The
demand for production-related inputs is the solution of the dual problem of minimizing total cost,
given by Wtnp,t(i)+Rtki,t, subject to the production constraint (3.12). The resulting optimal











The corresponding total cost function, CT (yi,t), and the associated marginal cost, ϕi,t,a r e


























α is a positive constant.
Firm i’s intertemporal problem can be stated as choosing a sequence of prices Pi,t and an
amount of advertising-related labor ha,t(i) in order to maximize the discounted value of all future











πi,t = Pi,tyi,t − CT(yi,t) − Wtha,t(i)
gi,t = ωzi,t +( 1− δg)gi,t−1
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where r0,t is the ﬁrm’s discount factor,14 and CT(yi,t), is deﬁned as in (3.17). The ﬁrst-order























(Pi,t − ϕi,t)+( 1− δg)(φi,t+1rt,t+1) (3.21)
Equation (3.19) describes the familiar ﬁrm’s pricing policy. The ﬁrm exploits its monopolistic
power by charging a positive markup (μi,t) over the marginal cost. Equation (3.20) deﬁnes the
shadow price φi,t as the marginal cost of producing advertising. Equation (3.21) is the optimal
advertising policy, stating that a ﬁrm chooses the optimal level of goodwill by equating its marginal
beneﬁt with its marginal costs. Substituting equation (3.20) into (3.21), solving the resulting




















14Under the assumptions of a perfect ﬁnancial market and households holding the ownership of the ﬁrms, the
















This expression shows that the optimal amount of advertising chosen by ﬁrms is sensitive
to both cost and demand conditions. On one hand, exogenous reductions of the wage rate, or
exogenous increases in technology, push the marginal cost of advertising downward, thereby raising
the ﬁrm’s incentive to advertise. On the other hand, since the marginal beneﬁt of advertising
depends positively on net revenues, which in turn are determined by the demand,15 then exogenous
variations of demand aﬀect the ﬁrm’s spending in advertising in the same direction. Interestingly,
the marginal beneﬁt of advertising increases in the stochastic discount factor rt,t+j, implying
that any change in the discount factor, such as variations in the interest rate due to monetary
authority or variations due to exogenous shocks driving economic ﬂuctuations, aﬀect advertising
expenditures.
Finally, it is interesting to note that ﬁrms’ pricing and advertising policy are directly related.
According to equation (3.22), a ﬁrm will ﬁnd it convenient to increase its advertising budget
in response to an increase in the unit net revenue from sales caused by a higher relative price.
Using the terminology of Iwasaki et al. (2008), this means that, in our framework, ﬁrms play a
supermodular game, since their pricing and advertising policies are complementary strategies.16
3.3 The Symmetric Equilibrium
The equilibrium for the model economy is derived by imposing a clearing condition in all
markets. Let Yt denote total output obtained by integrating (3.12) over the ﬁrms’ index. The
clearing condition on the goods market requires:
Yt = Ct + It (3.23)





Notice that conditions (3.23) and (3.24), together with the equations describing the optimal
choices of all agents in the economy, imply that the capital market also clears.
Given the symmetry embedded in our model, there exists an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms
set the same price, produce the same quantities, and invest the same amount of resources in
advertising. Thus, we restrict our analysis by focusing on such symmetric equilibrium. In addition,
we will normalize the price of consumption goods, pi,t to 1, so that all remaining prices are deﬁned
in terms of contemporaneous consumption.
The next proposition summarizes suﬃcient conditions to guarantee that a balanced growth
path exists, that is, an equilibrium in which all the variables grow at a positive constant rate, with
the exception of the interest rate, labor and the aggregate markup, which instead stay constant.
Proposition 1. Consider an economy in which monopolistically competitive ﬁrms may promote
their products by incurring advertising expenditures. Suppose furthermore that consumer prefer-
ences are deﬁned as in equation (3.1) and that the technology for producing goods and advertising
15See equation (3.19).
16Supermodular games are a general class of noncooperative games where n players simultaneously choose a
set of strategies. Iwasaki el al. (2008) discuss the general property of advertising that unequivocally leads to
a supermodular game in the context of an oligopolistic market in which ﬁrms simultaneously choose advertising








are given as in equations (3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Then, a suﬃcient condition for a balanced












where Bg(Gt,A t) denotes the partial derivative of function B(·) with respect to the ﬁrst argument
and evaluated at the aggregate goodwill stock, Gt.
Assuming that function B(·) satisﬁes the requirements of proposition 1, it is convenient to
express the model economy in terms of detrended variables, for which there exists a deterministic
steady state. Denoting with   St = St/At the original variable St detrended by the rate of technology
At and letting Xt =(  Gt,μ t,   Zt,H t,H a,t,H p,t,   Ct,   Kt,   It,   Yt,R t,   Wt,     Ct) be the vector of the
detrended endogenous variables, a symmetric equilibrium for the model economy can be deﬁned
as a pair of initial conditions (K0,G 0) ∈ R2
+ and a process {Xt}
∞
t=0 that satisﬁes the following
system of equations:
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(3.27)
    Ct =   Ct +   B(  Gt,A t) (3.28)
Ht = Ha,t + Hp,t (3.29)
  Yt = Hα
p,t   K1−α
t − F (3.30)
  Zt = Hα
a,t (3.31)
  Gt =
(1 − δg)
γa
  Gt−1 + ω   Zt (3.32)
γa   Kt+1 =( 1− δk)   Kt +   It (3.33)
  Yt =   Ct +   It (3.34)
ξH
φ
t =   Wt
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3.4 The Steady State
The steady-state equilibrium is derived from the above system of equations by assuming that
the vector Xt is constant over time. As shown in the Appendix, we can conveniently summarize
the equilibrium relationships (3.25)-(3.34) by introducing a map V : R3
+ → R10
+ such that Vt =
V (Jt), where Vt =(Hp,t,R t,   Kt,   Wt,   Yt,   It,     Ct,   Gt,   Zt,     Ct), and Jt =( Ht,μ t,H a,t). The steady
state equilibrium of the model is then characterized in next proposition.
Proposition 2. A stationary perfect foresight equilibrium is as a sequence {Vt,J t}∞
t=0 such that









































α and where R,   C and   G and deﬁned as in equations (C.2),
(C.7) and (C.9) in the appendix.
By analyzing proposition (2), we identify three channels through which advertising aﬀects
the steady-state equilibrium. First, given equation (3.37), the long-run markup depends upon
aggregate advertising. This is a price channel through which advertising ends up aﬀecting all
other endogenous variables. Second, by virtue of equation (3.29), the production of advertising
activities absorbs labor, thereby reducing the total amount of resources available for producing
goods. Unless the steady state results in a greater amount of hours worked, this channel implies
that the equilibrium level of GDP is lower than it would have been without advertising. Finally, the
aggregate goodwill stock aﬀects the marginal evaluation of consumption. As discussed in section
3.1, this mechanism modiﬁes the representative consumer’s decisions about labor and savings,
thereby modifying the aggregate supply of productive factors. We will see that the pressure
provided by this mechanism on the supply of hours turns out to be crucial in determining the
macroeconomic eﬀects of advertising.
The next proposition summarizes the long-run eﬀects that unequivocally result from the pres-
ence of ﬁrms’ advertising expenditures in the economy.
Proposition 3. In the steady state equilibrium, the ratio of consumption to GDP and the labor
income share increase with advertising.
Basically, advertising aﬀects the steady-state equilibrium by generating a redistribution of
resources from capital to labor. As stated in the proposition, the share of GDP that remunerates
labor services is higher than it would be without advertising. This feature hinges on the property
that, at the steady state, the interest rate is independent of advertising (see equation (3.27)), while
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption does depend on advertising.
Therefore, all adjustments between the productive factors occur through changes in the wage rate.
This aﬀects the factor markets asymmetrically, resulting in a general equilibrium in which the labor
share increases. In addition, the resource constraint (3.34) implies that the ratio of investment to
GDP unequivocally decreases with advertising, thereby making the economy more consumption









The three channels discussed in the previous section, by inducing countervailing eﬀects on the
endogenous variables, make the actual impact of advertising in aggregate not easily predictable.
Consider, for instance, the supply of hours. Although we know that advertising shifts the labor
supply schedule to the right, the general equilibrium eﬀect is ambiguous. Given equation (3.35),
movements in consumption may oﬀset the impact of advertising on marginal utility so that the
labor supply schedule may shift upward or downward or may remain unchanged. This depends on
the relative strength of the diﬀerent mechanisms at play and, eventually, on model parametrization.
Furthermore, because the system of equations representing the steady-state equilibrium is non-
linear, an explicit solution for the vector of endogenous variables cannot be found. Therefore, in
what follows, we perform several numerical experiments in order to evaluate the aggregate eﬀects
of advertising.
4.1 Calibration
In order to explore the quantitative properties of our model economy, we need to assign speciﬁc
numerical values to the structural parameters. To this end, we ﬁrst parameterize the function B(·)







where θ>0 is a parameter that controls for the eﬀect of advertising on the consumer’s preferences.
It is easy to verify that (4.1) satisﬁes all the assumptions made so far about B(·). It is increasing
and convex in the goodwill stock, gi,t, and it satisﬁes the requirements of proposition 1. Also,
notice that this formulation implies that the marginal utility of consumption is bounded. Because
of this bound, the demand schedule (3.4) features a maximum price above which the demand is
zero: when the price is too high the marginal beneﬁt of consuming that good is smaller than
its cost, and the consumer drops it from his basket of purchases. In this fashion, ﬁrms have an
incentive to advertise their products to reduce the bound. In the absence of advertising, the bound
is constantly equal to 1, while with advertising, the bound depends on the level of goodwill, whose
eﬀect is larger with larger θ. Hence, this parameter is interpreted as a measure of the eﬀectiveness
of advertising in aﬀecting consumers’ tastes.
Second, we calibrate model parameters, { β, σ, φ, ξ, ε, θ, α, δg,δ k,γ a,ω ,θ }, as follows.
The standard parameters of real business cycle models are calibrated according to the values
commonly used in the literature, while the others are chosen such that the steady-state values
of model variables match selected long-run moments in the US postwar data. In particular, the
discount parameter β is set to (1.04)−.25, implying a yearly nominal interest rate of about 4%.
The growth rate of technology γa is set to 1.005 so that the annual growth rate of GDP is 2%. The
depreciation rate of capital δk is equal to 3% per quarter, and the gross elasticity of substitution
across varieties is equal to 6. The preference parameter ξ is chosen to ensure that the consumer
devotes in equilibrium 1/4 of his time to labor activities. Following Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006), we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.5, the labor elasticity of
output α to 0.75, and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to 1.3. These restrictions imply that
the preference parameters σ and φ are 2 and 0.77, respectively.
The values of advertising related parameters have been assigned using the following strategy.
The goodwill depreciation rate has been ﬁxed at 0.3, implying that the half life of goodwill stock










β. 9952 Subjective discount factor
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution across varieties
δk 0.03 Capital depreciation rate
ξ 2.351 Preference Parameter
δg 0.3 Goodwill depreciation rate
φ 0.77 Inverse of Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply
θ 2.62 Intensity of advertising in the utility function
α 0.75 Labor elasticity of output
σ 2 Inverse of Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
ω 0.949 Advertising Eﬃciency
γa 1.005 Growth Rate of Technology
(1976): the eﬀect of advertising on the ﬁrm’s demand basically vanishes after one year. The
intensity of advertising in the utility function θ is set to 2.62, a value consistent with the empirical
evidence reported in Molinari and Turino (2009), while ω is ﬁxed such that, conditional on all
other parameters, the steady-state value of advertising over GDP is equal to 2.27%, consistently
with US average over the 1948-2005 period.17 The time period in the model is one quarter. Table
3 summarizes the set of calibrated parameters.
4.2 Steady State Eﬀects
We now quantitatively characterize the steady-state equilibrium of our model economy. In order
to disentangle the eﬀects resulting from the presence of advertising expenditures by ﬁrms, we will
compare our model with a benchmark framework in which ﬁrms cannot advertise their products.
To this end, we will ﬁrst perform a static comparative exercise by analyzing the eﬀect on the
steady-state of alternative values for the advertising eﬃciency parameter, ω. All else being equal,
given equation (3.36), this parameter controls for the optimal level of goodwill chosen by ﬁrms,
thereby determining the aggregate amount of resources absorbed by advertising. In particular,
when ω = 0 ﬁrms have no incentive to promote their products through marketing activities, and
the optimal level of advertising is zero. Thus, we take this as our benchmark model. Results are
reported in ﬁgure 3 and in the ﬁrst panel of table 4. Figure 3 displays the steady-state values
of selected endogenous variables as a function of the advertising eﬃciency parameter ω.F i g u r e s
are expressed as percentage deviations from their corresponding values in the benchmark model
without advertising. The ﬁrst panel of table 4 summarizes the quantitative eﬀects on several
endogenous variables by calibrating all parameters to the US economy. As a robustness check, the
table also provides the results obtained by setting the elasticity ε to alternative values.
Several remarks are in order. First, the advertising share monotonically increases with ω.F o r
larger values of this parameter, the rate of transformation of advertising to goodwill increases, so
that one unit of advertising becomes more eﬀective in enhancing demand. This raises the ﬁrms’
17This number refers to the ratio of advertising expenditures to net GDP, where exports are subtracted from GDP,





























































































































Figure 3: Steady state allocations as a function of advertising productivity ω. Endoge-
nous labor supply. All the variables are expressed as percentage deviation with respect to the
benchmark model without advertising (i.e. ω = 0). Resource absorption refers to the ratio of
advertising-related hours to total hours worked.
incentive to promote their products through marketing activities, thereby increasing the share of
their revenues devoted to advertising expenditures. In the aggregate, this implies that the amount
of resources absorbed by advertising increases with ω.
Second, the presence of advertising results in a steady-state equilibrium characterized by a
higher level of hours worked, output and its components. Moreover, all these variables mono-
tonically increase with ω. In other words, if we compare two economies that are identical in
all structural parameters except the value of ω, our model predicts that in the economy with
the larger advertising share we should also observe a higher level of hours worked, output and
consumption. This is clearly consistent with the positive cross-country correlations documented
in section 2. Additionally, the size of the eﬀects triggered by the presence of advertising in the
steady-state equilibrium turns out to be quantitatively important. For instance, our model pre-
dicts (see table 4) that, in the US economy, advertising induces an increase in hours worked in the
range 7.31%-10.9%, depending on the value chosen for the gross elasticity of substitution among
varieties ε. Similar magnitudes characterize variations in output, consumption and investment.
However, the ratio of advertising-related labor to total hours worked −which we called resource
absorption− also increases with ω, thereby reducing the amount of labor available for producing
consumption goods. As a result, the increase in the equilibrium level of GDP, ranging from a
minimum of 6.31% to a maximum of 9.90%, is lower than the increase in total hours worked. In
addition, the redistribution eﬀect discussed in section 3.4 implies a substantial diﬀerence in the
variation of consumption and investment, even though the increase in the consumption share is
instead quantitatively more contained.








aggregate goodwill stock is crucial in generating the eﬀects discussed so far. This is apparent by
noticing that the real wage monotonically decreases with ω, thereby indicating that the increase
in total hours worked is necessarily driven by the excess of supply that occurs in the labor market.
Then, the larger availability of working hours ends up increasing the equilibrium level of GDP
and its components. To further explore this feature, it is useful to compare the model derived in
section 3 with two alternative models where we assume: (i) that labor supply is exogenous and
(ii) that the aggregate goodwill has no eﬀect on the marginal utility of aggregate consumption.
In both cases, advertising does not directly aﬀect the supply of labor, and therefore the general
equilibrium eﬀects are driven by price movements and resource absorption induced by advertising.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst alternative model is based on the same setup used in section 3; the only
diﬀerence is that the consumer inelastically supplies a ﬁxed amount of working hours.18 In the














Under this speciﬁcation of B(·), the eﬀectiveness of ﬁrm i’s advertising on its own demand
depends not only on its goodwill stock, gi,t, but also on the level of goodwill of its competitors.
In the symmetric equilibrium, function B(·) is equal to 1 for any value of   Gt and the marginal
utility of consumption thus becomes independent of the aggregate stock of goodwill. Consequently,
the eﬀects of advertising on labor supply and aggregate consumption are indirect. Among other
things, this formulation implies that advertising is a zero-sum game for ﬁrms, since it just redis-
tributes demand across ﬁrms without aﬀecting the market size. We will refer to this case as purely
combative advertising. The results are summarized in panels 2 and 3 of table 4.
Compared with the baseline, the alternative models deliver two main results that highlight the
importance of the labor supply channel for the macroeconomic consequences of advertising. First,
the assumption that advertising does not directly aﬀect labor supply implies largely diﬀerent eﬀects
on the GDP and its components. Either with purely combative advertising or with an exogenous
labor supply, the presence of advertising results in lower levels of output, consumption, and invest-
ment. Moreover, without the labor supply channel, any increase in the equilibrium level of hours
worked, which is driven by an excess of demand for labor, is completely absorbed by the produc-
tion of advertising activities. This is apparent by noticing that with purely combative advertising
the equilibrium level of GDP and its components decrease even though the equilibrium level of
hours worked increases (see panel 3). Second, the eﬀect of advertising on the main aggregates is
substantially smaller in both of these alternative models than in the baseline. For example, the
variation of GDP with respect to the benchmark model (in absolute value) is about 14 times lower
when the labor supply is assumed to be exogenous and when the elasticity of substitution among
goods is set to 6. This means that the labor supply channel operates as a powerful ampliﬁcation
mechanism, which indirectly magniﬁes the impact of advertising to GDP.19
Another interesting implication of our model is that the presence of advertising results in a
higher level of both hours worked and output even though the steady-state equilibrium is char-
18More precisely, in the model’s simulations, we set H =1 /4.
19For example, notice that in the baseline calibration, our model predicts that a 2% amount of aggregate resources








Table 4: Results and Models Comparisons
ε ΔY ΔC ΔI ΔH Δμ Δ(C/Y)
Baseline Model
5 6.31 6.50 5.66 7.31 0.55 0.17
6 8.09 8.27 7.42 9.09 0.54 0.17
7 9.90 10.1 9.23 10.9 0.52 0.17
Exogenous Labor Supply
5 -0.73 -0.50 -1.53 0 0.34 0.23
6 -0.54 -0.37 -1.14 0 0.26 0.17
7 -0.56 -0.39 -1.17 0 0.27 0.17
Purely Combative Advertising
5 -0.17 -0.01 -0.74 0.01 -0.01 0.16
6 -0.17 -0.01 -0.75 0.01 -0.01 0.16
7 -0.18 -0.01 -0.76 0.01 -0.01 0.17
Note:Δ x refers to the percentage deviation of the original variable x with respect to its benchmark value
without advertising (γ = 0). Panel 1 displays the results for the baseline model. Panel 2 displays the results for the
model with an exogenous labor supply. Panel 3 provides the results for the model in which function B(·)i ss p e c i ﬁ e d
as in equation (4.2).
acterized by a larger aggregate markup (see ﬁgure 3). Unlike the standard results,20 this feature
provides a theoretical counterexample, showing that an increase in the market power is not nec-
essarily associated with a lower level of hours worked and output. To understand this result
intuitively, it is worth comparing our model with the canonical framework. In the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz model with monopolistic competition in the goods market, ﬁrms’ market power results
in a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution from leisure to consumption and the wage
rate that makes the consumer less willing to work. This eﬀect results in a suboptimal equilibrium
level of both hours worked and output. On the contrary, in our framework, advertising decreases
the elasticity of substitution among goods but, at the same time, increases the marginal utility
of aggregate consumption. As a result, the consumer feels disaﬀection with the current level of
consumption that leads him to supply more working hours, while ﬁrms’ gain market power that
they exploit by charging a higher markup over the marginal cost. The negative eﬀect related
to the increase in ﬁrms’ market power is then oﬀset by the stronger substitution eﬀect induced
by advertising, and eventually the equilibrium level of hours worked increases. This mechanism
provides us with a case where utility-diminishing advertising can be welfare enhancing. We will
return to this point in section 6.
In the last part of this section, we propose a sensitive analysis to evaluate the extent to which
the model’s predictions are sensitive to alternative calibrations of the structural parameters. In
particular, given the crucial importance of the labor supply channel to our results, we restrict
our attention to the parameters that aﬀect the labor supply schedule, that is, the inverse of
intertemporal elasticity, σ, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, φ.F i g u r e 4
















































































































Figure 4: Steady State Hours Worked, Output, and Consumption as function of ad-
vertising productivity for various value of φ,a n dσ. All the variables are expressed as
percentages deviation from the benchmark value in the model without advertising expenditures
(ω =0 )
illustrates the results, displaying, for alternative values of φ and σ, the graphs of hours worked,
output and consumption as functions of ω. All the variables are expressed as percentage deviations
from their benchmark values.
As shown in the ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 4, the size of the steady-state eﬀects declines with larger
φ. Intuitively, increasing this parameter implies a lower value of the Frisch elasticity and therefore
a smaller reaction of labor supply to variations in wage and marginal utility of consumption.
Hence, the downward pressures provided by the increase in the aggregate markup and the resource
absorption due to advertising activities oﬀsets the eﬀect generated by the increase in the supply of
hours, thereby reducing the size of the steady-state eﬀect on output and consumption for any given
ω. As matter of fact, for large enough values of φ, the equilibrium levels of these two aggregates
decrease even though the equilibrium level of hours worked increases.
Regarding the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, notice that the eﬀect of advertising on
the main aggregates declines with lower σ. In this case, the substitution eﬀect between consumption
and leisure becomes smaller, and therefore the consumer’s willingness to work declines. As such,
the labor supply reacts less to equal movements in the aggregate goodwill, and consequently total
hours worked, output, and consumption all increase less. Moreover, when σ is set to a suﬃciently
low value, the main results are reverted. As shown in ﬁgure 4 (see the dotted line), hours worked
and the main aggregates monotonically decrease with ω. In such a circumstance, although the
aggregate markup is still aﬀected, the labor supply schedule becomes almost independent of the
aggregate goodwill stock, and thus advertising ends up exacerbating the distortions associated
with the monopolistically competitive structure of the goods market. As a result, hours worked,








To summarize, in this section we have shown that the steady-state equilibrium levels of hours
worked, outputs, and its components are larger with advertising than they would be otherwise.
Moreover, as long as the representative consumer’s labor supply is suﬃciently elastic to movements
in the marginal utility of consumption, the sizes of these eﬀects are quantitatively important.
However, the assumptions of endogenous labor supply and advertising with market-enhancing
eﬀects are both crucial for these results. On the contrary, the presence of advertising ends up
exacerbating the distortions associated with the monopolistically competitive structure of the
goods market, providing quantitatively small eﬀects.
5 Advertising and Labor Supply
Beyond the macroeconomic consequences of advertising, the connection between the aggregate
goodwill stock and the representative consumer’s decisions about working activities is interesting
per se. The connection suggests that aggregate advertising might potentially be an important
determinant of labor supply. In section 2, we showed that the amount of resources absorbed by
the advertising sector features a substantial within-country variation and, at the same time, shows
remarkable diﬀerences across countries. Thus, advertising, by providing pressures on labor supply
that vary over time and across countries, may potentially contribute to the observed within-country
variations of labor supply, as well as cross-country diﬀerences in hours worked per capita. This
feature is particularly important in light of the literature that studies the determinants of the labor
supply decisions−an issue that has spurred a large amount of research in all branches of economic
theory. In this perspective, this paper identiﬁes an alternative mechanism that aﬀects labor supply
decisions that has so far been overlooked by economic theory. In the following sections, we study
this connection by testing the ability of our model to explain both within-country and cross-country
variations in labor supply.
5.1 The US boom in the 1990s
In the 1990s, the US economy experienced a decade of sustained economic growth. As we can
see in ﬁgure 5, during this period, per-capita hours worked steadily increased, dropping back to
the level of the early 1990s only with the recession in 2001. As emphasized by McGrattan and
Prescott (2007), the basic neoclassical growth model, while accounting well for the post-war US
economy prior to the 1990s, fails to reproduce the last economic boom. The reason for this failure
is that, by incorporating variations in total factor productivity (TFP) and in marginal taxes on
labor income, the neoclassical growth model predicts an after-tax real wage below its secular trend
that, in turn, implies a decline in the predicted hours worked when, in fact, there was an increase.
Other factors must have played a role in determining the behavior of the US during that period of
time. McGrattan and Prescott suggested that the huge increase in intangible investments, such as
those in building organizations, advertising, or expenditures in research and development, might
be the missing piece of the puzzle to explain the economic boom in the 1990s.
McGrattan and Prescott, however, used their intuition to draw from an opportunely modiﬁed
neoclassical growth model, an implicit aggregate series of intangible assets during the 1990s. With
respect to their paper, then, we completed a reverse engineering exercise. We possess the actual
series of advertising, and we used it to check whether our model can replicate the behavior of
actual labor series during the 1990s. We suspect that advertising goes in the right direction to
explain labor dynamics because, during the 1990s, advertising expenditures in the US experienced
sustained growth. This is apparent in ﬁgure 1, which shows that advertising, relative to GDP,



















Figure 5: Hours worked during the US boom in the 1990s. Model’s predictions vs actual
data. All the data are taken from McGrattan and Prescott (2007). Bench refers to the model
without advertising (ω =0 ) .
our model, this should provide an upward pressure on the labor supply, thus possibly explaining
the observed puzzling dynamics in hours worked. In order to address this issue, we performed a
business cycle accounting (BCA) exercise like that developed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007). Namely, we made use of data on investment, GDP, hours worked, advertising expenditures,
and taxes in order to recover from our model’s equilibrium conditions three exogenous wedges that
allow for a perfect match between the data and model predictions.21 More speciﬁcally, we used
the intratemporal condition (3.9) to recover the labor wedge, the Euler equation (3.10) to recover
the investment wedge, and the optimal advertising policy (3.21) to recover the advertising wedge.
Furthermore, in order to recover a sequence for TFP, we modiﬁed both production functions
(3.12) and (3.13) by introducing a multiplicative term that captures purely transitory variations in
productivity. Also, we introduced in our model taxes on labor income, τt, so that the representative
consumer’s intratemporal condition becomes:
ξH
φ
t =( 1− τt)  Wt
 
  Ct +   B(   Gt,A t)
 −σ
(5.1)
Then, we compared actual data for hours worked with the model’s predictions obtained by shutting
down the labor wedge and instead allowing for taxes, TFP, and other wedges to vary. Since the
labor wedge has been proven to be the main determinant of labor dynamics within the basic
neoclassical model,22 our exercise was able to disentangle the eﬀect of advertising on the labor
supply during the 1990s.
Figure 5 compares the model’s predictions for hours worked with the US actual hours worked
per capita. As a benchmark case, we reported predicted hours worked per capita in the model
21Details on the procedure are provided in the Appendix.








without advertising (ω = 0). As can be seen in this ﬁgure, the canonical neoclassical growth model
predicts a constant decline in hours worked, when they were in fact increasing. As in McGrattan
and Prescott’s study, the model with a constant labor wedge fails to predict the boom in the 1990s.
On the contrary, the model with advertising predicts the dynamics of labor remarkably better,
showing a constant increase in hours worked per capita. To understand this result intuitively, recall
that our framework naturally provides a theory for the household’s disutility of work to be time
varying. This is apparent from equation (5.1), which shows that for a given level of consumption
the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the after-tax real wage depends on the aggregate
level of goodwill over time. In particular, for a given wage rate, the larger the aggregate goodwill
stock, the stronger the consumers’ willingness to work. Given the sustained growth observed in
advertising share, this eﬀect appears to have been particularly strong during the 1990s. In fact,
while we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the recovered TFP, the labor wedge in the model
with advertising is remarkably lower than the one we obtained in the benchmark.23 The eﬀect of
variations on the stock of goodwill on the marginal utility of consumption overcompensates for the
eﬀect caused by the dynamics of the after-taxes real wage, thereby implying an increasing pattern
in per-capita hours worked, as observed in the data. Although the ﬁt of our model is far from
perfect and clearly implies that other factors may have played a role in determining the dynamics of
labor, the experiment shows that our framework substantially improves on the neoclassical model,
conﬁrming that the connection between advertising and labor supply operated as an important
mechanism in determining the aggregate level of hours worked, at least in the US economy.
5.2 Cross-country comparison
In this section, we test the ability of our model to explain the observed cross-country diﬀerences
in hours worked. To this end, we compare actual data of per-capita hours worked in the US
and selected European countries with the model’s predictions for Ht.24 Given the availability of
international data on advertising expenditures, we restricted the analysis to the period 1996-2006.
As evident from table 5, our sample is characterized by large diﬀerences in average hours worked
and advertising shares between the US and Europe. In both cases, the US is the leading country.
Therefore, this is an interesting case study to evaluate the contribution of advertising in explaining
the huge diﬀerences in hours worked between the US and Europe.
The analysis starts by assuming that the only source of cross-country heterogeneity is given by
the size of the advertising sector. The ﬁrst panel of table 5 refers to this comparison. Figures are
obtained by setting the structural parameters to their baseline values, with the exception of the
advertising eﬃciency parameter, ω, which is chosen by targeting the country-speciﬁc advertising
share, and the preference parameter, ξ, which instead is calibrated to match the average hours
worked in the US over the years 1996-2006. Following this calibration, any diﬀerence in per-capita
hours worked predicted by the model is imputed to the diﬀerent advertising share by country. In
the second panel of table 5, we repeat the experiment by introducing other sources of cross-country
heterogeneity, namely TFP and marginal taxes on labor income. Predictions here are obtained
by calibrating the structural parameters as in panel (I), with the exception of taxes parameter
τ, and TFP parameter, Υ.25 In particular, τ is chosen by targeting the country-speciﬁc average
marginal tax over the considered period of time, and Υ is chosen to match the average TFP by
23See ﬁgure 7 in the Appendix.
24Predictions are obtained by computing the steady state equilibrium of the model economy.
25Υt is the multiplicative term we add to the production functions for both goods and advertising. This factor








Table 5: Cross-Country comparison, baseline model predictions.
Labor Supply (US=1) Prediction Factors
Country Actual Predicted Diﬀ Adv/Gdp Tax Rate τ TFP (US=1)
(I) Heterogeneity in Advertising
Germany 0.71 0.93 0.25 1.28 0 1
France 0.73 0.91 0.32 0.97 0 1
Italy 0.66 0.91 0.26 0.89 0 1
United Kingdom 0.89 0.96 0.33 2.11 0 1
USA 11 - 2 . 7 6 0 1
(II) Heterogeneity in Advertising, TFP and Taxes
Germany 0.71 0.71 0.99 1.28 0.59 0.89
France 0.73 0.70 1.11 0.97 0.59 0.92
Italy 0.66 0.65 1.03 0.89 0.64 0.98
United Kingdom 0.89 0.91 0.78 2.11 0.44 1.06
USA 1 1 - 2.76 0.44 1
(III) Heterogeneity in Taxes and TFP (Benchmark Model)
Germany 0.71 0.80 0.69 0 0.59 0.89
France 0.73 0.80 0.75 0 0.59 0.92
Italy 0.66 0.74 0.76 0 0.64 0.98
United Kingdom 0.89 0.96 0.36 0 0.44 1.06
USA 1 1 - 0 0.44 1
Note: Labor Supply and Total Factor Productivity are both relative to the corresponding US values. Diff =
(1 − H
actual) / (1 − H
predicted) indicates the fraction of actual diﬀerence in hours worked between a country x and
the US economy that is explained by the model. Panel (I) provides the results for the baseline model by assuming
cross-country heterogeneity in the advertising sector. Panel (II) same as panel (I) but letting both taxes on labor
income and TFP to vary. Panel (III) displays the results for the benchmark model (γ = 0) by assuming cross-country
heterogeneity in both marginal tax on labor income and TFP. Marginal taxes on labor income, τ, are taken from
Prescott (2004). Predictions are obtained by computing the steady state equilibrium of the model. Further details
are provided in appendix.
country.26 The third panel of table 5 replicates the same analysis in panel (II), except that it
sets ω = 0. By doing so, we drop advertising expenditures from the model, and therefore all the
predicted cross-country diﬀerences in hours worked are imputed to the cross-country variability in
both TFP and taxes on labor income. We report results for the US, Germany, France, Italy, and
the UK.
Several remarks are worth emphasizing. First, according to our model’s predictions, diﬀerences
in the size of the advertising industry explain an important part of the cross-country variability in
hours worked: as we can see from the ﬁrst panel of table 5, allowing for this source of heterogeneity
26More speciﬁcally, TFP is recovered from data using the model equilibrium conditions. Marginal taxes on labor
income are taken from Prescott (2004). Note that, in all experiments, we adjusted the data in order to be consistent








alone explains between 1/4a n d1 /3 of the actual diﬀerence between the US and selected European
countries. Second, our experiment conﬁrms to a large extent the results provided in Prescott
(2004): over the decade 1996-2006, as in the early 1990s, cross-country heterogeneity in both
taxes on labor income and TFP appears to be crucial in explaining the US-Europe diﬀerence in
average hours worked. In fact, allowing for these sources of heterogeneity notably improves the
predictions of our framework with respect to the case of heterogeneity in the advertising share
alone. Moreover, as we can see from the second panel of table 5, the results in this case are
remarkable. The model ﬁt is almost perfect. It is worth emphasizing, however, that heterogeneity
in the advertising sector still plays an important role in explaining the variability in the labor
supply across countries, even when we allow for variance in taxes and TFP. To see this, note that
the model’s ﬁt worsens sensibly once we drop advertising heterogeneity from the model (see panel
3 of table 5). Therefore, although taxes and TFP are surely important, our experiments show
that, during the decade 1996-2006, other factors contributed to the diﬀerences in hours worked
between the US and Europe, and we identify advertising as one of these factors.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is worth noticing that the mechanism behind our results is consistent with
the idea, originally suggested by Blanchard (2004), that cross-country diﬀerences in hours worked
might simply reﬂect cultural diﬀerences in the evaluation of leisure. According to Blanchard’s
vision, if Europeans enjoy leisure more than Americans, then any equal increase of wage would
asymmetrically aﬀect their labor supplies because the income eﬀect would be stronger in Europe
than in the US. In our model, the mechanism is exactly the same but with the key diﬀerence that
cross-country variability on the marginal evaluation of leisure is endogenously determined by the
eﬀect of advertising on the consumer’s preferences. In this perspective, our model predicts that
even if Americans and Europeans shared the same ex ante preferences toward consumption and
leisure, Americans would nonetheless have worked more because of the stronger desire for material
consumption due to the larger advertising spending in the US market.
6W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
In section 4.2, we showed that the presence of advertising results in a steady-state equilibrium
characterized by a larger level of both consumption and worked hours, in spite of the fact that
the economy experiences a larger aggregate markup at the same time. This feature of the model
suggests that utility-diminishing advertising can be welfare improving, as it can potentially induce
a lower level of aggregate leisure, thus mitigating the distortion of monopolistic competition. In
what follows, we perform a welfare analysis to test whether this is in fact the case.
The evaluation of the welfare consequences of advertising is, however, complicated by the fact
that preferences are endogenously determined, as has been emphasized by Dixit and Norman
(1978). If advertising aﬀects consumers’ taste, there are at least two natural yardsticks for welfare
comparisons: the pre-advertising and post-advertising tastes,27 and it is not clear ap r i o r iwhich of
these yardsticks is the most appropriate. For this reason, we follow Benhabib and Bisin (2002) by
introducing a welfare criterion that takes into account both pre- and post-advertising preferences.
More precisely, denoting the representative consumer’s allocation pair and his equilibrium utility
function by (C(ω),H(ω)) and U(C(ω),H(ω),ω), respectively,28 we will make use of the following
criterion:
Deﬁnition 1. The consumer’s welfare increases due to advertising if and only if it increases with
27That is, the utility functions used to derive, respectively, pre- and post-advertising demands.








respect to post-advertising preferences, so that
U(C(ω),H(ω),ω) ≥ U (C (0),H(0),ω)
and it also increases with respect to pre-advertising preferences,
U(C(ω),H(ω),0) ≥ U(C(0),H(0),0)
with at least one inequality holding strictly.
In other words, for a given ω>0, we will say that the consumer is better oﬀ with advertising if,
independently of whether we are using pre- or post-advertising preferences as a welfare yardstick, he
prefers the post-advertising allocation (C(ω),H(ω)) to the pre-advertising allocation (C(0),H(0)).
The top panel of ﬁgure 6 provides the graphs for the representative consumer’s utility function
for alternative values of parameter ω. All the remaining parameters are calibrated to their baseline
values.29 In order to facilitate comparisons, the bottom panel of the ﬁgure provides graphs for
welfare gain (in terms of steady-state consumption) associated with a policy that completely
bans advertising.30 Several remarks are in order. First, while the welfare gain strictly increases
with ex-ante preferences, it displays a hump-shaped pattern with ex-post preferences, becoming
negative for values of ω that are larger than the cutoﬀ point ω∗ (see the graph at the right-bottom
corner). According to our criterion, this implies that the consumer is unequivocally worse oﬀ with
advertising for any ω ∈ [0,ω∗].31 In this case, the presence of advertising ends up exacerbating
the welfare losses caused by the monopolistic competitive structure of the goods market. Unlike
canonical results, however, welfare losses in our framework are driven by the ”overworking” eﬀect
induced by advertising and not by the reduction in consumption due to higher prices (higher
markup). Consumption, in fact, increases with ω, as shown in section 4.2.
Second, our experiment shows that persuasive advertising does not necessarily imply a welfare
loss for the society. To the contrary, if we use ex-post preferences as a yardstick for welfare
comparisons, for a large enough value of ω, consumers are instead better oﬀ with advertising. In this
perspective, notice that in the calibration that replicates the US economy, in which ω =0 .949 >ω ∗,
we cannot conclude that the consumer is worse oﬀ with advertising, since he prefers the allocation
with advertising when choosing according to post-advertising preferences.
Finally, our model predicts that a consumer’s satisfaction and per- capita income are neg-
atively correlated. As we have seen in section 4, conditional to the baseline calibration, total
output is in fact an increasing function of advertising eﬃciency, while, as shown in ﬁgure 6, the
utility associated with the equilibrium allocations is instead decreasing, independent of whether
we focus on pre- or post-advertising preferences. This result is consistent with the fact that no
clear relationship between average income and average happiness can be found across countries
(see Graham (2005)). In fact, the literature on the economics of happiness suggests that other
factors, such as social aspirations or relative income considerations, contribute to an individual’s
sense of well-being. For instance, Laynards (2005) stresses the extent to which social status aﬀects
people’s happiness. Also, the increasing ﬂow of information about the living standards of others
can increase frustrations with relative income diﬀerences. From this perspective, individuals may
engage in consumption not only for its intrinsic value, but also for its value in signaling their rela-
tive position in the income distribution. Heﬀetz (2009) provides evidence for such a phenomenon,
29As shown in section 4.2, under this calibration the equilibrium levels of hours worked and consumption mono-
tonically increase with ω.
30More precisely, for any given ω, the welfare gain is deﬁned as the value of λ that solves the equation:
U(λC(ω),H(ω),ω)=U(C(0),H(0),ω)
































































          Welfare Gains Welfare Losses
Figure 6: Welfare Analysis. Steady state utility functions. Left panel: pre-advertising prefer-
ences. Right panel: post-advertising preferences. The bottom panel illustrates the welfare gain, in
terms of percentage of steady-state consumption, of a policy that completely bans advertisements.
showing that households’ consumption decisions are aﬀected by the so-called socio-cultural visibil-
ity of consumer expenditures, which he deﬁnes as the speed with which members of society notice
a household’s expenditures on diﬀerent commodities. Our framework embeds many of these fea-
tures, providing a mechanism that makes endogenous the welfare losses driven by the increasing
aspirations for material consumption. It is interesting to notice that, although we did not assume
preferences for relative consumption (or status), the core mechanism of our model is consistent with
the potential connection between advertising and socio-cultural visibility of consumption goods.
As shown in Kr¨ ahmer (2006), if consumers use brands for image and visibility, then advertising,
by informing individuals of the brand name, makes for a good potential signaling device, thereby
inducing households to engage in conspicuous consumption. This mechanism creates a connec-
tion between advertising and aggregate consumption expenditures that is similar to the one we
obtained in our model. Moreover, in our framework, as in models with preferences for relative
consumption, e.g., Fisher and Hof (2000), if a consumer’s decisions about working activities are
endogenous, then advertising, by producing an overworking eﬀect, might reduce the individual’s
sense of well-being even though he consumes more.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we studied the inﬂuence of persuasive advertising in a neoclassical growth model.
Our ﬁndings show that the long-run equilibrium levels of hours worked, outputs, and its compo-
nents are higher with advertising than they would be otherwise. Furthermore, as long as the
representative consumer’s labor supply is suﬃciently elastic to movements in the marginal utility








with a new stylized fact provided in this paper: advertising is positively correlated with hours
worked, GDP and consumption across the OECD countries. However, the assumptions of an
endogenous labor supply and advertising with market-enhancing eﬀects are both crucial for our
theoretical results. On the contrary, the presence of advertising ends up exacerbating the distor-
tions associated with the monopolistically competitive structure of the goods market, providing
quantitatively small eﬀects. Because of the connection between advertising and labor supply, we
also showed that our framework improves on the neoclassical model in explaining both within-
country and cross-country variability of labor supply. Among other things, our ﬁndings suggests
that cross-country variability in the size of the advertising sector contributes to the explanation for
the huge observed diﬀerences in hours worked between the US and Europe. Finally, we provided
a welfare analysis that allowed us to identify some portions of the model parametric space where
the eﬀect of advertising on the consumer’s welfare is unambiguous. In these cases, the consumer
is worse oﬀ with advertising, but the eﬀect is fairly small.
To conclude, the main insight from our paper is that understanding the potential linkage
between advertising and labor supply is crucial to properly assess the macroeconomic eﬀects of
advertising. Despite the evidence reported by Brack and Cowling (1983) and Fraser and Paton
(2003), the literature is still lacking an appropriate empirical analysis that documents this rela-
tionship by involving a cross-country comparison of advertising and labor supply. Exploring this
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AD a t a
Advertising expenditures data
• Germany: Investment in advertising including expenditures on salaries, media and the production
of means of publicity for the period 1950-2000. Sources Rehme G., and Weiser S. (2007) table 7.
• United Kingdom: Annual advertising expenditures all the media. Data from 1950 to 1991 are
provided to us by courtesy of Stuart Fraser. The data from 1991 to 2005 are taken from IPA
(www.ipa.co.uk).
• USA: Data from 1948 to 1999 are obtained from an updated version of Robert J. Coens (McCann-
Erikson, Inc.) original data published in Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times
to 1970. The data for 2000 to 2005 are obtained from the Newspaper Association of America
(http://www.naa.org). The aggregate data include spending for advertising in newspapers, mag-
azines, radio, broadcast television, cable television, direct mail, billboards and displays, Internet, and
other forms.
• Japan: Data from 1975 to 2005. Source DENTSU (www.dentsu.com)
• Others OECD countries data from 1996 to 2006. Source World Advertising Research Center
(WARC). Advertising Media and Forecasts.
Macro aggregates.
• Output, Consumption and Investment are from the OECD dataset. Investment are net of housing.
• Per capita hours worked are taken from Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Con-
ference Board, Total Economy Database, January 2007, http://www.ggdc.net
• Data for marginal taxes on labor income are taken taken from Prescott (2004)
• Macro aggregates for the business cycle accounting exercise are taken from McGrattan and Prescott
(2007).
• Country speciﬁc capital for the cross-country analysis are taken from Kiel Institute for the world
economy (http://www.ifw-kiel.de/forschung/datenbanken/netcap).
B Proof of proposition 1
A balanced growth path an equilibrium where all the endogenous variables grow at a constant rate.
Given the structure of our model economy, we want to show that any function B(·) satisfying the require-
ments stated in proposition 1 implies the existence of such an equilibrium. Before proceeding, it is worth
noting that the assumption of labor-augmenting Cobb-Douglas technology for the production of goods, the
capital accumulation equation (3.33) and the good market clearing condition (3.34) imply that the steady-
state rates of growth of output, capital, investment and consumption are all equal to the growth rate of
labor augmenting technical progress, γa. These conditions together with the clearing condition (3.28) imply
constancy of both advertising and production related labor. Given the production function of advertising
activities (3.31) and the accumulation equation (3.3), this also implies that the goodwill stock and adver-
tising have the same rate of growth γa. Thus, denoting one plus the growth rate of a variable X as γX,i n
the balanced growth path equilibrium it must be true that:
γY = γK = γI = γC = γZ = γG = γa > 1( B . 1 )
and








Using the terminology of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), equations (B.1)-(B.2) describe the techno-
logically feasible steady state. Notice, moreover, that the same conditions also implies: (i) the marginal
product of capital is constant over time; (ii) the marginal product of labor grows at the rate γa.
Next, we need to show can that any function B(·) that satisﬁes the restrictions stated in the proposi-
tion implies that conditions (B.1)-(B.2) are compatible with all the optimality conditions of agents in the










indicates that for hours worked to be constant it is required that   Ct and At grow at the same rate γa.T h u s ,
















we note that   Ct grows at the rate γa if and only if also B(Gt,A t) does. Given that the goodwill stock grows










In addition, by virtue of equations (3.25), (3.26), (3.27) and (3.37), this condition also implies that: (i)
both the aggregate mark-up and the interest rate stay constant; (ii) the representative consumer’s Euler
equation is satisﬁed; (iii) the real wage grows at the rate γa.
To conclude the proof it remains to show that equation (3.21) is satisﬁed along the balanced growth
path. To this end, notice ﬁrst that equation (3.20) implies that in the balanced growth equilibrium the
advertising marginal cost stays constant, which, from equation (3.21), implies:
Bg(Gt,A t)=Bg(Gt+1,A t+1)








This concludes the proof.
C Proof of proposition 2
We begin the proof by showing how to construct a map V : R3
+ → R10
+ that links a subset of endogenous
variables to the vector Jt =( H,μ,Ha). To this end, let us assume that the economy is at the steady-state.
From the clearing condition in the labor market we can derive en expression for production-related labor:
Hp = H − Ha ≡ Hp(H,μ,Ha)( C . 1 )
and for the Euler equation (3.27) an expression for the long run net interest rate:
R =
γa − β(1 − δk)
β





















which, in turn, allows us to explicitly derive an expression for both capital stock and wage rate. That is:







(H − Ha) ≡   K(H,μ,Ha)( C . 3 )








≡   W(H,μ,Ha)( C . 4 )








p K1−α − WHa
Substituting this equation into the deﬁnition of output (3.30), and using equations (3.25) and (3.29)
into the resulting expression yields:







[H − (1 − α)Ha] ≡   Y (H,μ,Ha)( C . 5 )
An expression for the equilibrium level of investment can be derived using the low of motion for the
capital stock. Accordingly:








(H − Ha) ≡   I(H,μ,Ha)( C . 6 )
where ¯ δk = γa − (1 − δk). Thus, using the goods market clearing condition, the equilibrium level of
consumption can be rewritten as follows:











[H − (1 − α)Ha] ≡   C(H,μ,Ha)( C . 7 )
Finally, by virtue of equations (3.28), (3.31) and (3.32) we get:
  Z = Hα
a ≡   Z(H,μ,Ha)( C . 8 )
  G =
 
γaω
γa − (1 − δg)
 
Hα
a ≡   G(H,μ,Ha)( C . 9 )
    C =   C +   B(   G,At) ≡     C(H,μ,Ha) (C.10)
Therefore, letting Vt =(Hp,t,R t,   Kt,   Wt,   Yt,   It,     Ct,   Gt,   Zt,     Ct), we can conveniently summarize the
equilibrium relationships (C.1)-(C.10) by introducing a map V : R3
+ → R10
+ such that Vt = V (Ht,μ t,H t,a).
To conclude the proof, we next derive a set of equilibrium conditions that allows us to identify among
all the vectors Jt =( H,μ,Ha) those representing a steady-state equilibrium. To this end, notice ﬁrst that











  C +   B(   G,A)
 −σ
(C.11)

























and where R,   C and   G and deﬁned as in equations (C.2), (C.7) and










which, in turn, allows us to express aggregate output as follows:





Thus, substituting equation (C.5) into the previous one, and solving for H, yields:












Hence, at the steady-state the vector Jt =( H,μ,Ha) is the solution of the system of equations (C.11)-
(C.13). Therefore, a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium for the model economy can be now deﬁned as
a sequence {Vt,J t}∞
t=0 such that Vt = V (H,μ,Ha) ∀ t and where the vector Jt =( H,μ,Ha) ∈ R3
+ satisﬁes
equations (C.11)-(C.13).
D Proof of proposition 3
Let sh(H,Ha) denotes the labor income share as a function of total hours worked, H, and advertising-







H − (1 − α)Ha
 
>α≡ sh(H,0) ∀ Ha ∈ (0,H)
which shows that with advertising the labor income share is unequivocally larger than otherwise (i.e. Ha =
0). To prove that the consumption share increases with advertising, it is enough to note that equations








H − (1 − α)Ha
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(H,0) ∀ Ha ∈ (0,H)
E Details on the BCA exercise
Simulation of the model is performed by following several steps and using yearly data over the period
of time 1990-2003. Figures for macro-aggregates are taken from McGrattan and Prescott (2007). .
Step 1
To perform the BCA exercise, we begin by slightly modifying the model presented in section 3. More




t =( 1− τt)  Wt
 
  Ct +   B(   Gt,A t)
 −σ
(E.1)
and we modify both the production functions for goods and advertising activities in order to introduce a
factor, Υt, capturing purely transitory variations in total factor productivity (TFP). That is:
  Yt =Υ tHα
p,t   K
1−α
t − F (E.2)










As second step, we need to assign numerical values to all the model structural parameters. Some of
them are set to their baseline values as reported in table (3), while the other are calibrated in order to: (i)
take into account the yearly frequency of the data; (ii) match speciﬁc moments for the 1990 US (detrended)
data. More speciﬁcally, we set the growth rate of technology, γa to 1.02, implying a yearly growth rate of
GDP of 2%; the depreciation rate δg is ﬁxed to 0.7, implying a half-life for the goodwill stock of about
half year; the elasticity ε is set to 9, implying, as in the baseline case, an average mark-up equal to 5%.
Parameters σ, θ,a n dφ are set to their baseline values. The remaining parameters (β;ω;α;δk;ξ;Υ) are
calibrated by using the US level of detrended variable in 1990 for GDP (normalized to 1), capital stock,
hours worked, consumption, advertising expenditures, and by setting the yearly real interest rate to 1.041.
Step 3. Constructing the series of exogenous and endogenous variables
In order to simulate the model, we need ﬁrst to construct sequences of all the endogenous and exogenous
variables, including three exogenous wedges. To this end, we make use of data for output   Yt, investment
  It, advertising expenditures   Zt, hours worked Ht and taxes on labor income, τt. Exogenous wedges are
introduces into the model in order to force the agents’ optimality conditions so that, by computing the
perfect foresight equilibrium, the model’s predictions coincide with the observable data.
More speciﬁcally, we use the accumulation equation (3.33) with observations for the initial capital stock
(the 1990 value) and investment to construct sequences of capital stocks. A series of aggregate consumption
is obtained by using the resources constraint (3.34) with observations for detrended output and investment.
Sequences of TFP is recovered by ﬁrst noting that, by virtue of equations (3.29) and (E.3), the production
function can be rewritten as follows:
  Yt =Υ tH
α
p,t   K
1−α
t − F
=Υ t (Ht − Ha,p)














so that Υt can be expressed as:
Υt =
 
(  Yt + F)
1
α +   K
1−α
α










Sequences of Ha,t and Hp,t are derived by using equations (3.29) and (E.3) with observations for   Zt, Ht and
Υt. To perfectly match data for detrended advertising expenditures we modify the accumulation equation
(3.32) by introducing an advertising wedge, Xz,t, as follows:
  Gt =
(1 − δg)
γa
  Gt−1 + ωXz,t   Zt
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A sequence of labor wedges, Xh,t, is recovered by combining the representative consumer’s intratemporal





































































Figure 7: Total Factor Productivity and the Labor Wedge. Note: Benchmark refers to the
model without advertising expenditures (γ =0 ) .







Finally, using equations (E.5)-(E.7) and equations (3.25), (3.26), (3.28) and (3.37) with observations for
GDP, Investment, Consumption, labor related variables, TFP and taxes on labor income we simultaneously
recover sequences of   Wt, Rt, μt,     Ct, Gt, Xz,t, Xh,t and Xk,t.
By construction, if we compute a perfect-foresight equilibrium path for this model, assuming households
take as given time paths for TFP, tax on labor income and wedges, we get a perfect match between the
model predictions and the data. Figure provides graph for the estimated series for the labor wedge and
TFP in our framework, along with the corresponding sequences obtained in the benchmark case without
advertising.
Step 4. Simulation
To analyze the ability of our model to explain the dynamics of hours worked during the 1990s, we
compute the perfect-foresight equilibrium path by setting the labor wedge constantly equal to 1. By doing
so, we are able to disentangle the eﬀect upon the labor supply of advertising expenditures by comparing
the model’s predictions with data. Figure 5 provides the results.
F Details on Cross-Country comparison.
To perform the cross-country analysis, we compute the steady state equilibrium of our model economy
by allowing for cross-country heterogeneity in the advertising sector, TFP and taxes on labor income. As
in the case of the BCA exercise, we need ﬁrst to construct a sequence for country-speciﬁc TFP. To this








is constructed by using the accumulation equation (3.33) with detrended data of investment. Data for the
country-speciﬁc initial capital stock is taken from Kiel Institute for the world economy (http://www.ifw-
kiel.de/forschung/datenbanken/netcap). In computing the country-speciﬁc steady-state, in order to intro-
duce cross-country heterogeneity in TFP, we set the TFP parameter, Υ, to the country average over the
period of time 1996-2006. Marginal taxes on labor income are taken from Prescott (2004).
40